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Why Is the Universe of Sets Not a Set?
Zeynep Soysal
Abstract According to the iterative conception of sets, standardly formalized by
ZFC, there is no set of all sets. But why is there no set of all sets? A simple-minded,
though unpopular, “minimal” explanation for why there is no set of all sets is that the
supposition that there is contradicts some axioms of ZFC. In this paper, I first explain
the core complaint against the minimal explanation, and then argue against the two
main alternative answers to the guiding question. I conclude the paper by outlining a
close alternative to the minimal explanation, the conception-based explanation, that
avoids the core complaint against the minimal explanation.
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1 Introduction
According to the iterative conception of sets, standardly formalized by Zermelo–
Fraenkel set theory with Choice (henceforth ‘ZFC’), there is no set of all sets. Fol-
lowing common usage, let ‘the universe of sets’ refer to the “totality” of sets in the
iterative hierarchy of sets.1 Two questions naturally arise: (i) What, if not a set, is
the universe of sets? (henceforth ‘the what-question’) and (ii) Why is the universe of
sets not a set? (henceforth ‘the why-question’). The why-question will be the guiding
question of this paper, and investigating it will require us to look at the what-question.
Note that there are equivalent what- and why-questions about other “totalities” that
are not members of any sets, such as the “totality” of all ordinals; although I won’t
directly address those questions in this paper, the discussions that follow could be
generalized to apply to them as well.
Zeynep Soysal
Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, 25 Quincy Street, Cambridge, MA 02138
E-mail: soysal@fas.harvard.edu
1 I intend the expression ‘the universe of sets’ to be neutral with respect to the nature of the “totality”
of all sets in the iterative hierarchy. As we will see in this paper, the universe of sets may be a proper
class, a plurality, an incomplete totality, a potential hierarchy (in which case there does not actually exist a
plurality of all sets), etc.
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Here is a simple-minded response to the why-question:
Minimal Explanation The universe of sets is not a set because the assumption that it
is contradicts some axioms of ZFC.2
There are a number of different ways to derive a contradiction from the assumption
that the universe of sets is a set—e.g. via the Foundation and Pairing axioms, the
Separation axiom, the Burali-Forti argument, Cantor’s Theorem—and each one gen-
erates a more specific instance of the minimal explanation. To have a clear example in
mind, let me expand the instance of the minimal explanation generated by the proof
from Foundation and Pairing (henceforth ‘the Minimal ExplanationF, P’) by spelling
out how the contradiction is derived: “The universe of sets V is not a set because the
assumption that it is contradicts Foundation and Pairing, as follows. If you assume
that V is a set, then {V} is also a set (by Pairing). Thus {V} must have a mem-
ber that is disjoint from {V} (by Foundation). The only member of {V} is V , hence
V ∩{V}= /0. But V ∈V (by definition of V ), so V ∩{V} 6= /0. Contradiction.”
Many philosophers seem to think that the minimal explanation is not a good an-
swer to the why-question. In this paper, I first make precise the core complaint against
the minimal explanation (§2), and then argue against the two main alternative answers
to the why-question: the size-actualist answer (§3) and the potentialist answer (§4).
The problems with the alternative answers give us reason to reconsider the minimal
explanation as an answer to the why-question. I conclude the paper by outlining a
close alternative to the minimal explanation, the conception-based explanation, that
avoids the core complaint against the minimal explanation.
2 The Core Complaint Against the Minimal Explanation
Philosophers frequently note that one can derive a contradiction from the assumption
that there is a set of all sets, but then they simply repeat the why-question. Here is
Keith Simmons doing just that:
[W]ith the combinatorial/iterative conception in mind, why can’t we “collect
together” or “lasso” all the sets in the ZF hierarchy, and form the collection
of them all? (Simmons, 2000, 111)
More recently, right after stating the instance of the minimal explanation with Sepa-
ration, James Studd asks: “What is it about the world that allows some sets to form
a set, whilst prohibiting others from doing the same?” (Studd, 2013, 699). It is nat-
ural to take such philosophers to think that the minimal explanation doesn’t explain
why the universe of sets is not a set. Some—like Michael Dummett here concerning
the instance of the minimal explanation with Cantor’s Theorem—make this thought
more explicit:
2 The discussion can be generalized to other why-questions by formulating equivalent forms of the
minimal explanation. So, for instance, the equivalent “minimal explanation” for the why-question about
the “totality” of all ordinals would be: “The totality of all ordinals is not a set because the assumption that
it is contradicts some axioms of ZFC.”
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A mere prohibition leaves the matter a mystery. ... And merely to say, “If
you persist in talking about the number of all cardinal numbers, you will run
into contradiction,” is to wield the big stick, but not to offer an explanation.
(Dummett, 1991, 315–316)
However, it is hard to find a clear statement of what exactly is wrong with the
minimal explanation as an answer to the why-question. The following two passages
contain what I take to come closest to a precise complaint against the minimal expla-
nation.
Right before stating his own potentialist answer to the why-question, Stephen
Yablo states:
This [Minimal ExplanationF, P] brings what the Russell set is by nature into
conflict with a basic fact about sets, viz. well-foundedness. But one may ques-
tion whether the fact is basic enough. To say that ... [the universal set] can-
not exist because it would be ill-founded seems to get things the wrong way
around. It is because sets like ... [the universal set] are independently prob-
lematic that we are drawn to a requirement that keeps those sets out. (Yablo,
2004, 149)
One way to understand Yablo here is as follows: There is some fact about the universe
of sets that explains both why it is not a set and why we adopt Foundation as an axiom
(i.e. why “we are drawn to a requirement that keeps those sets out” (ibid.)). So, even
though we can derive that the universal set doesn’t exist from Foundation, we have to
provide that “deeper” fact in explaining why the universal set doesn’t exist. That fact,
as Yablo later goes on to propose, concerns the “potential” nature of the universe of
sets.3
In the same vein, James Studd, who also gives a potentialist answer to the why-
question, suggests that the answer to the why-question ought to appeal to something
about sets, and not merely to what can be derived within certain theories:
The derivation of Russell’s paradox in Naı¨ve Set Theory demonstrates the
logical falsity of the instance of the Naı¨ve Comprehension schema ... . This
provides—I am happy to grant—as good an explanation as we should expect
for why this theory is inconsistent. However, the question of real interest is
not why this instance of Naı¨ve Comprehension yields a contradiction, but why
certain sets—in this case, those that lack themselves as elements—are unable
to form a set. And this cannot be explained merely by appeal to logical truths.
(Studd, 2013, 700)
I thus propose we understand the core complaint against the minimal explana-
tion as follows. The minimal explanation is a perfectly good answer to the following
question: “Why is the universe of sets not as set according to ZFC?” But the minimal
explanation fails to provide the deeper reason why these axioms that prohibit the ex-
istence of the universal set are there in the first place. So the minimal explanation is
not a deep enough explanation of why the universe of sets is not a set; it is not a good
answer to the why-question.
3 See for instance Yablo (2004, 152–155).
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Understanding the core complaint this way also helps make sense of the alterna-
tive answers to the why-question. Indeed, most philosophers propose to answer the
why-question by appealing to some “deep” fact about the nature of the universe of
sets—one that may also provide some independent motivation or explanation for the
axioms of set theory that prohibit the existence of the universal set. Their answers
naturally go with either of two theories concerning the deep nature of the universe of
sets: actualism (more specifically, the Limitation of Size Principle) and potentialism.
In what follows, I will argue in turn against the size-actualist and the potentialist an-
swers to the why-question. Of note is that my arguments in this paper aren’t directed
against actualism or potentialism in general; they are only directed against their re-
spective answers to the why-question. Of course, if the main motivation to endorse
either actualism or potentialism is to answer the why-question, then my arguments
in this paper should also count against actualism or potentialism. At the beginning
of §4, I will provide some quotes from potentialists that suggest that answering the
why-question is a crucial motivation to endorse potentialism; but I will not go further
in arguing against the general potentialist thesis in this paper.
3 Actualism
For lack of standard terminology, let me use ‘actualism’ as the name of the gen-
eral thesis that the universe of sets is some sort of “completed totality.” Actualism is
thus an answer to my what-question. Proponents of actualism include George Boo-
los, John Burgess, David Lewis, Gabriel Uzquiano, and arguably Kurt Go¨del. Some
actualists take a “completed totality” to be a proper class: a well-founded extensional
object that is not a set.4 Others take it to be a plurality that cannot be “singularized”
into one object (either a set or a proper class).5
Actualists accept some version of the Limitation of Size Principle, if only because
it is derivable in most set theories with proper classes or pluralities:6
Limitation of Size Principle A collection, C, is not a set if and only if it is of the same
size as V (the totality of all sets) or Ω (the totality of all ordinals).
A number of actualists appeal to the Limitation of Size Principle to justify some of
the axioms of ZFC, by stating that an axiom that asserts the existence of sets with
a certain property is true if the relevant sets are “small” enough.7 Similarly, such
actualists use the Limitation of Size Principle to provide an explanation for why the
universe of sets is not a set: The universe of sets is not a set because it is “too large”
to be a set. Let me call this ‘the size-explanation’, and actualists who endorse the
size-explanation ‘size-actualists’.8
4 See for instance Welch (ms), Lewis (1991), and Mayberry (1986).
5 See for instance Boolos (1984), Burgess (2004), and Uzquiano (2003).
6 The derivation requires some version of the axiom of Global Choice. See for instance Linnebo (2010,
162) for the derivation of a limitation of size principle from plural set theory.
7 See for instance Fraenkel et al. (1973). For a thorough study of the history of the Limitation of Size
Principle from Cantor to von Neumann and beyond, see Hallett (1984).
8 Size-actualism is defended in Fraenkel et al. (1973) and by Georg Cantor, John Von Neumann, Dmitry
Mirimanoff and other Limitation of Size-Theorists, as explained in Hallett (1984). More recently, Welch
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My aim in this section is to criticize the size-explanation as an answer to the why-
question. Many philosophers have already objected to the size-explanation, but I think
they did so on the wrong grounds. I will thus first consider the most common objec-
tion to the size-explanation, which I call the ‘Arbitrary Threshold Objection’, and
argue that it fails to undermine the size-explanation (§3.1). The Arbitrary Threshold
Objection is often also taken to be a problem for actualism more generally; in §3.1,
I will respond to the objection on behalf of all actualists (including size-actualists). I
will then present a different objection to the size-explanation (§3.2).
3.1 The Arbitrary Threshold Objection
Øystein Linnebo formulates the Arbitrary Threshold Objection nicely in (Linnebo,
2010).9 According to Linnebo, the actualist is committed to there being a “threshold
cardinality beginning at which pluralities are too large to form sets” (Linnebo, 2010,
152). Let us call it ‘T’. He states that the actualist may characterize T either explicitly
as, for instance, the first strongly inaccessible cardinal, or implicitly by using the
plurality of all ordinals as a “measuring stick” and understanding T as the cardinality
instantiated by the plurality of all ordinals (Linnebo, 2010, 152). He then challenges
the actualist as follows:
The main challenge [for the actualist] will be to motivate and defend [T] ...
. Why should this particular cardinality mark the threshold? Why not some
other cardinality?
... Wherever it has been possible to go on to define larger sets, set theorists
have in fact done so. So it remains arbitrary that there should be no sets of
this cardinality or some even larger one. (Linnebo, 2010, 152–153)10
Linnebo’s challenge for the actualist is to explain why T is not an arbitrary threshold,
and to do so in a way that doesn’t fly in the face of the practice of set theorists to define
sets of larger and larger cardinalities. The Arbitrary Threshold Objection, then, is that
the actualist can’t meet this challenge.
Let me take up this challenge on behalf of the actualist. My goal is to show that
the actualist can coherently maintain the existence of both (i) a distinction between
sets and classes (or pluralities that don’t form sets), (ii) a non-arbitrary threshold T,
and (iii) sets of larger and larger cardinalities.
The first thing to note is that for set theorists, κ is a cardinal if and only if κ is an
ordinal, and for every η < κ , there is no one-to-one correspondence between η and
κ (i.e. η 6≈ κ). The cardinality of a given set A, written ‘|A|’, is in turn defined as the
(ms, 9) assumes some version of the size-explanation. Arguably (and as Linnebo states in Linnebo (2010,
151, fn. 9)) size-actualists also include Burgess (2004) and Lewis (1991). Actualists who aren’t size-
actualists include Peter Koellner and Hugh Woodin; they endorse some version of the minimal explanation.
9 I take Linnebo’s statement of the Arbitrary Threshold Objection to be the clearest, but others make it
too. See for instance Fine (2006, 23), Studd (2013, 700), and Yablo (2004, 152f., 155).
10 See also Linnebo (2013, 206): “To disallow such a set [of all sets] would be to truncate the iterative
hierarchy at an arbitrary level.”
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least ordinal κ such that A≈ κ (hence for all A, |A| is a cardinal).11 Since all ordinals
are sets, crucially, all cardinals and cardinalities are sets.
The actualist accepts these definitions. She then agrees with her challenger that
there are sets of larger and larger cardinalities, as is borne out by the practice of
set theory. The important point comes now: The actualist doesn’t think of T as a
cardinality in the sense above. If she did, the Arbitrary Threshold Objection would
go through: How could she maintain both that there are sets of larger and larger
cardinalities, and that there is a threshold cardinality above which there are no sets
of larger cardinality? The threshold would not only be arbitrary, but inconsistent with
her commitments.
The actualist will think of the “size” T differently. For instance, she may define
‘same size’ by stating that A has the same size as B if and only if A≈ B, and at least
partially define ‘size’ by stating that (a) if A has a cardinality |A|, then the size of A
is |A|, and (b) if A doesn’t have a cardinality and has the same size as V , then the size
of A is T. Now the “location” of T is certainly not arbitrary, because T is the first size
at which the assumption that A has size T implies, on pain of contradiction, that A is
not a set.12 Moreover, the existence of larger and larger cardinalities doesn’t have any
bearing on the “location” of T. It is true that for any cardinality κ , there are sets A of
cardinality greater than κ . It is also true that every cardinality is a size. But it surely
doesn’t follow from these two facts that for any size S, there are sets of size greater
than S.
At this point, opponents of actualism (or size-actualism) could raise a variant
arbitrariness complaint: “It would be arbitrary to maintain that for any cardinal κ ,
there are sets A of cardinality greater than or equal to κ , but that for some size T,
there are no sets A of size greater than or equal to T.” The actualist should respond
that there simply are no sets A that have size greater than or equal to T, on pain of
contradiction. She may appease her opponents by accepting that there are collections
of size greater than T (such as “Super-Classes,” collections of size greater than classes
that are neither sets nor classes);13 in other words, she may (perhaps reluctantly)
accept that just as there are larger and larger cardinalities, there are larger and larger
sizes. Either way, though, her crucial point is that not all sizes are sizes of sets, on
pain of contradiction, and hence that, yet again, nothing about T has been shown to
be arbitrary.
Finally, opponents of actualism may question the actualist’s reliance on the dis-
tinction between cardinalities and sizes, and the distinction between sets and classes.
They may claim that there is a natural kind, so to say, of all things that intuitively
count as “collections,” that set theory is supposed to be the study of those, and hence
that anything that intuitively counts as a “collection” should be treated as a set. From
the actualist’s perspective, though, this simply mischaracterizes set theory. On the ac-
tualist conception, not all things that intuitively count as “collections” are sets—the
11 This definition requires the Axiom of Choice. Without Choice, one can use Dana Scott’s trick to define
|A| = {X | X is of minimal rank s.t. A ≈ X}. Since the collection of sets of a given rank is always a set,
cardinalities are always sets according to this definition.
12 One can derive a contradiction from the assumptions that A ≈ V and that A is a set by using for
instance Replacement.
13 Such entities are discussed for instance in Le´vy (1976).
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universe of sets is one such example. To support her conception, the actualist could
assert that we don’t have a pre-theoretic conception of the domain of all “collections,”
that instead our only access to the subject-matter of set theory is through our theories.
And according to our theory, not all things that intuitively count as “collections” are
sets, on pain of contradiction. That being said, we can still theorize about all collec-
tions by supplementing ZFC with a theory of classes (or even Super-Classes... if one
wishes).14 Hence set theory is compatible with a fully general study of all things that
intuitively count as collections—simply not all collections are sets. Once one accepts
the actualist position concerning the nature of the universe of sets, there is nothing
arbitrary about T: It is exactly where it is supposed to be. We may have other reasons
for rejecting actualism, but the actualist’s size-explanation remains coherent at least
in the face of the Arbitrary Threshold Objection.
3.2 The Objection from the Explanatory Insignificance of Size
That being said, I think there is a much better objection against the size-explanation,
which I call the ‘Objection from the Explanatory Insignificance of Size’.15 The Lim-
itation of Size Principle is a generalization about collections that are not sets, but it is
not an explanatory generalization. For a given collection C, the principle tells us that
it cannot be a set if it is of the same size as V (by Replacement). But then our question
is simply pushed back from C to V : “Why can’t V be a set?” Most arguments that use
the Limitation of Size Principle start off with the assumption that V or Ω is not a set
on pain of contradiction, and show that neither can any collection of the same size
as V or Ω be a set.16 But we don’t have an argument relating the size of V or Ω to
the reason why these collections cannot be sets. The size-explanation doesn’t tell us
anything beyond the minimal explanation for why V or Ω are not sets.
An analogy might be useful here. If you scaled me up (that is, if you increased
my height while keeping my shape the same), there is a height H above which my
body would collapse under its own weight. Consider the following question: “Why
is this particular size H the threshold above which I would collapse under my own
weight?” The answer to this question will appeal to the “square-cube law,” namely
that if my size (measured in height) is scaled-up by multiplier m, then my surface
14 For instance, with Von Neumann–Bernays–Go¨del (Go¨del, 1940), Morse–Kelley (Kelley, 1955) or
Le´vy–Ackermann set theories (Ackermann, 1956) as theories of classes, or with the formalization by
Burgess (2004) as a theory of pluralities.
15 After raising the Arbitrary Threshold Objection, Linnebo goes on to raise another objection to the
size-explanation that is perhaps best understood as a version of the Objection from the Explanatory In-
significance of Size. He states: “To probe further, consider the question why there are not more ordinals
than ... [Ω ]. ... According to the view under discussion, the explanation is that ... [Ω ] are too many to form
a set, where being too many is defined as being as many as ... [Ω ]. Thus the proposed explanation moves
in a tiny circle. The threshold cardinality is what it is because of the cardinality of the plurality of all ordi-
nals, but the cardinality of this plurality is what it is because of the threshold. I conclude that the response
fails to make any substantial progress, and that the proposed threshold remains arbitrary” (Linnebo, 2010,
153f.). Here in §3.2, I aim to clarify this type of objection, disentangle it from the Arbitrary Threshold
Objection, and connect it to the minimal explanation.
16 E.g. Cantor’s argument for the Aleph Theorem, which states that every cardinal is an aleph (cf. Hallett
(1984, 169)), and other arguments cited in Hallett (1984, 165ff.).
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area is scaled up by m2 and my volume by m3. The reason why that particular size H
marks the threshold is that my bone strength is (roughly) proportional to the surface
area of the cross section of my bones, but weight is a function of volume, hence after
H, my bones won’t be able to support my increased weight.
This explanation appeals to size in a satisfactory way: It connects a particular
size H to the event of my body collapsing under its own weight via constraints of
physics. In the case of the size of the universe of sets, we have been given no such
explanation: Nothing “connects” the size of the universe to its not being able to form
a set via constraints of set-theory. The problem with the size-explanation isn’t that the
size-actualist presupposes that there is this one particular size after which pluralities
don’t form sets; rather, the problem is that the size-actualist doesn’t mention anything
about how size in general, and how this particular size in particular, plays a role in
explaining why the universe of sets is not a set. The size-explanation doesn’t add any
explanation for the why-question beyond the minimal explanation.17
4 Potentialism
For lack of standard terminology, let me use ‘potentialism’ as the name of the general
thesis that the universe of sets is never “completed.” More exactly, for the potential-
ist, necessarily, no matter how many stages of the hierarchy have been formed, it is
always possible that there be a further stage containing sets whose members do not
form sets in any of the preceding stages. Potentialism is thus another answer to my
what-question. Its proponents include Ignacio Jane´, Geoffrey Hellman, Øystein Lin-
nebo, Charles Parsons, Augustı´n Rayo, James Studd, William Tait, Stephen Yablo,
and arguably Kit Fine and Ernst Zermelo.18
Most (if not all) potentialists take potentialism to provide an explanation for why
the universe of sets is not a set: The universe of sets cannot be a set because the
universe of sets is never “completed,” and only “completed” totalities can form sets.
Here Parsons makes clear that potentialism provides an answer to the why-question;
he does this in the context of evaluating Georg Cantor’s distinction between “definite
multiplicities” and “inconsistent multiplicities” (Cantor, 1899):
I suggest interpreting Cantor by means of a modal language with quantifiers,
where within a modal operator a quantifier always ranges over a set ... . Then
it is not possible that all elements of, say, Russell’s class exist, although for
any element, it is possible that it exists. (Parsons, 1977, 346)19
17 In a recent paper, Christopher Menzel argues that the iterative conception of sets is intuitively consis-
tent with the existence of a proper-class sized set of ur-elements, and proposes a modification to Replace-
ment and Powerset to accommodate these “wide” sets (Menzel, 2014). Menzel (2014) may thus be seen
as providing an alternative argument for the insignificance of size in explaining why the universe of sets is
not a set: The universe of sets is still not a set according to Menzel’s modified formalization of the iterative
conception, but this has nothing to do with the “size” of the universe of sets.
18 See for instance Jane´ (1995), Hellman (1989) and Zermelo (1930). The other potentialists are cited
below.
19 Parsons also says that the totalities that don’t form sets are “merely potential,” where “one can distin-
guish potential from actual being in some way so that it is impossible that all elements of an inconsistent
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In the same vein, Linnebo makes clear that he endorses what he takes to be Cantor’s
answer to the why-question:
On [the potentialist] ... conception, the hierarchy is potential in character and
thus intrinsically different from sets, each of which is completed and thus
actual rather than potential. This intrinsic difference affords potentialists ... a
reason to disallow the disputed set formation.
... [One] attraction of the potentialist conception emerges in connection with
the hard question of the conditions under which some objects are eligible to
form a set. ... Cantor’s thought is that there is an intrinsic difference between
multiplicities that form sets and multiplicities that do not, and that this intrin-
sic difference explains why some but not all multiplicities are eligible for set
formation. (Linnebo, 2013, 206f.)20
My aim in this section is to criticize the potentialist’s explanation as an answer to
the why-question. I will first explain potentialism in more detail (§4.1). I will then
argue that on each of two ways of understanding the potentialists’s modality, their
answer adds no explanation for the why-question beyond the minimal explanation
(§§4.2–4.3).
4.1 The Potential Hierarchy
When we explain the iterative conception of sets, we usually speak as though sets
are formed in time. At the beginning we form no sets: V0 = /0. At the next stage we
form the set of all sets formed so far: V1 =P(V0) = { /0}. Continuing in this way
we obtain V2 =P(P(V0)), V3 =P(P(P(V0))), ... After all the finite stages, we
form the set of everything that came before, namely Vω =
⋃
n<ωVn. We can then start
taking powersets again, until the next limit stage, ω +ω , at which we form the set
of everything that came before, namely Vω+ω =
⋃
α<ω+ωVα , ... and so on, thereby
forming the cumulative hierarchy of sets (Figure 1).
Potentialists take this informal explanation, “replace the language of time and
activity with the more bloodless language of potentiality and actuality” (Parsons,
1977, 355), and then formalize it; their aim is to regiment a way of talking about
sets that includes claims about possibility, in particular the claim that any sets (any
zero or more sets) can form sets.21 To this end, they propose formal systems of set
theory supplemented by modal quantifiers ‘3∃’ and ‘2∀’, and either plural logic
(Linnebo), second-order logic (Parsons), or additional “backwards-looking” modal
multiplicity should be actual,” and then goes on to say that “where there is an essential obstacle to a mul-
tiplicity’s being collected into a unity, this is due to the fact that in a certain sense the multiplicity does not
exist” (Parsons, 1977, 345, my emphasis). So, for Parsons, the fact that the universe of sets is not a set is
“due to” its potential nature.
20 In his recent defense of potentialism, Studd similarly takes potentialism to provide an answer to the
why-question; he states that potentialism is supposed to answer the “difficult question” I cited above on
page 2, namely the question: “What is it about the world that allows some sets to form a set, whilst
prohibiting others from doing the same?” (Studd, 2013, 699, emphasis removed).
21 Studd calls this ‘the Maximality thesis’ (Studd, 2013, 699), Linnebo calls it ‘(C)’ (Linnebo, 2013,
219), and Parsons introduces it in Parsons (1977, 357).
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Fig. 1 The cumulative hierarchy of sets.
operators (Studd). Neither formalization adds any new results about sets: A formula
ϕ is derivable in ZF if and only if the formula ϕ3 that results from replacing each
quantifier in ϕ with its corresponding modal quantifier can be proved in modal set
theory.22 According to potentialists, this shows that “in the context of [their] modal
set theory the composite expressions 2∀ and 3∃ behave logically just like ordinary
quantifiers,” and is a reason why “the implicit modalities [they] have postulated in the
set-theoretic quantifiers do not surface in ordinary set-theoretic practice” (Linnebo,
2010, 164).
In outline, the potential hierarchy is a structure of possible worlds with an acces-
sibility relation that corresponds to S4.2 (Figure 223).24 Worlds are stages of the set
forming process, the domain of each world consists of the sets that have been formed
thus far, and the domain of each world accessible from a given world wα is a superset
of the domain of wα (Linnebo, 2013, 208). From each world wα , there are sets that
don’t exist at wα but that are possible relative to wα , i.e. sets that exist in the domain
of a world wβ which is accessible from wα . The overall structure of the potential
hierarchy is isomorphic to that of the cumulative Vα -hierarchy. Moreover, modal set
theory and non-modal set theory are “mutually interpretable,” in that modalized ver-
sions ZF3 of the ZF axioms are true of the potential hierarchy of sets,25 and modal
set theory can be interpreted in non-modal set theory (hence is also consistent rel-
ative to it).26 One way to think about the difference between ordinary set theorists
and potentialists is that the latter have “powerful instruments for studying the same
22 See for instance Linnebo (2013, 214) and Studd (2013, 710).
23 Note that, although Figure 2 suggests otherwise, the accessibility relation in S4.2 is not a linear rela-
tion; Figure 2 is merely intended to provide a rough visual idea of the potential hierarchy of sets.
24 In particular, Studd’s modalization is different from Linnebo’s in that it has two basic necessity op-
erators ‘2<’ and ‘2>’, and derived ones ‘2’, ‘2≤’ and ‘2≥’, corresponding respectively to S5 and S4.3
(for the last two). Here I set aside Studd’s formalization without loss of generality for my arguments in
§§4.2–4.3.
25 See for instance Linnebo (2013, 220ff.), Parsons (1983, 318ff.), and Studd (2013, 712ff.).
26 In particular, Linnebo maps his claim (C) (cf. fn. 21) that any sets (any zero or more sets) can form
a set onto the claim that for any stage α , and any subset of Vα , there is a later stage β such that all later
stages γ contain a set containing all and only those things in the subset of Vα (Linnebo, 2013, 224).







Fig. 2 The potential hierarchy of sets.
subject matter under a finer resolution” (Linnebo, 2013, 206); that is, they “uncover”
accessibility relations “between” stages Vα .
More generally, potentialists see their theses as providing a motivation for the
ordinary axioms of set theory; an intermediary, so to speak, between the iterative
conception described above and the ZF axioms (or, more exactly, between the itera-
tive conception and the ZF3 axioms, which can in turn be interpreted in ordinary set
theory). This intermediary step is supposed to motivate or explain why the axioms
hold, as we saw in Yablo’s quote in §2. See also:
[W]hen we confront difficult foundational and conceptual questions concern-
ing set theory, the finer resolution provided by the modal approach can be very
valuable. In particular, we will see that the modal approach makes available
a very natural motivation for the axioms of ZF set theory. (Linnebo, 2013,
206)27
Hence potentialists purport to be providing a “deep” account of the nature of the
universe of sets in the sense of §2.
Let me now turn to the potentialist’s answer to the why-question. In the potential
hierarchy, there is no universal set—there is no world wV at which all sets exist;
quantification over sets is always quantification over the domain of a world, but from
each world it is always possible to go on to form more sets, and hence there is no
27 See also Studd (2013, 698f.) where Studd says of Boolos’ stage theory (Boolos, 1971) that it provides
a good motivation for the axioms of set theory but is not able to preserve the claim that every sets can form
a set nor answer the why-question. Studd then proposes modal set theory as an alternative to stage theory.
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“totality” of all sets in any one world. Since there is no “totality” of all sets in this
sense, there is also no set of all sets. This is the potentialist’s answer to the why-
question (henceforth ‘the potentialist explanation’).28
Problems for the potentialist explanation arise once one carefully examines the
role and nature of potentialists’ notion of modality, which is key in their explana-
tion. All potentialists agree that their modality is not metaphysical modality: Since
pure sets and mathematical objects exist necessarily, there is nothing metaphysically
potential about the hierarchy of sets.29 Instead, they either take the modality as a
primitive notion idiosyncratic to mathematics, or interpret it to track set theorists’s
practice to accept sets of larger and larger cardinalities.30 These two options gen-
erate two slightly different versions of potentialism. In what follows, I evaluate the
potentialist explanation under each option.
4.2 Primitive and Idiosyncratic Modality
The first option is to take the potentialist’s modality as “mathematical modality,” a
primitive notion idiosyncratic to mathematics (Parsons, 1983, 327). Linnebo similarly
proposes:
Strictly speaking, all we need to assume about the above notion of modality
is that it is suited to explicating the iterative conception of sets. The modality
must thus be one on which the existence of a set is potential relative to the
existence of its elements (in the sense that, when some things exist, it is pos-
sible for there to exist a set with precisely these things as elements.) All other
details are optional. (Linnebo, 2010, 158)
In this subsection, I will argue that the potentialist explanation for the why-question
on this first option for interpreting the potentialist’s modality is redundant. I will do
so in two steps.
28 See for instance Parsons (1977, 345), quoted in fn. 19. Or, for instance, see Linnebo (2010), where
Linnebo argues that there is no set of all sets because there is no plurality of all sets, which is because the
universe of sets is potential in nature. He thus endorses what he takes to be the view of Yablo (2004, 152):
“How can there fail to be a determinate pool of candidates [i.e. a plurality of all sets]? According to Yablo,
the answer has to do with the iterative conception of sets. The universe of sets is build up in stages. At each
new stage we introduce all the sets that can be formed from the objects available at the preceding stage.
But there is no stage at which this process of set formation is complete. At any one stage it is possible to
go on and form new and even larger sets. This very suggestive answer needs to be spelled out. I will now
propose a way of doing so, based on the idea that the hierarchy of sets is a potential one, not a completed
or actual one” (Linnebo, 2010, 155).
29 See for instance Linnebo (2010, 158), Studd (2013, 706), Linnebo (2013, 226), Fine (2006, 31), and
Parsons (1983, 328).
30 Examples of the former include Linnebo (2013) and Parsons (1977). Linnebo considers the latter
option in Linnebo (2010, 159). Some potentialists simply propose to forgo specifying the modality: “A
full-fledged explanation of the modal notions will have to await another occasion” (Linnebo, 2013, 207).
See also Studd: “There is a great deal more to be said about each of these views, but it would take us too
far afield to say it here. Rather, safe in the knowledge that taking the tense more seriously than usual need
not commit us to taking it literally, I shall continue to elaborate on this view in general, leaving it open
(within the bounds of LST) how the modality is to be interpreted” (Studd, 2013, 707).
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The first step is to notice that the potentialist’s modalities come at a cost: Since
ordinary set theorists don’t use modal quantifiers, potentialists buy the distance be-
tween the axioms (and the why-question) and what explains them at the cost of having
to reinterpret the practice of set theorists. Potentialists need to establish a correspon-
dence between the practice of set theory and the “worlds” of the potential hierarchy,
and, in particular, specify the sets that are “actual” according to their modality. Lin-
nebo considers this difficulty and proposes two options for the potentialist. The first
option is to interpret set theorists to be working “at the world” which contains sets
“whose existence follows from our strongest, well-established set theory” (Linnebo,
2010, 159, fn. 21). I will examine this option in §4.3, as it is embodied in a slightly
different version of potentialism. The second option is not to specify any “actual”
world but instead to assign set theorists an “external” perspective on the potential
hierarchy of sets:
[S]et theorists generally do not regard themselves as located at some particular
stage of the process of forming sets but rather take an external view on the
entire process. It therefore would be wrong to assign ourselves any particular
stage of the process. (Linnebo, 2010, 159)
I will focus on this second option for the remainder of this subsection.
Assume set theorists in their practice take an “external” perspective on the po-
tential hierarchy. Note that potentialists, too, allow themselves such a perspective:
In order to prove Infinity3, for instance, Linnebo and Studd advocate a “reflection
principle,” ϕ3→3ϕ , which is understood as the claim that
... the truth of a claim in ‘the model’ provided by the potential hierarchy of
sets ensures that the claim is possible. For a claim ϕ to be true in this ‘model’
is for ϕ to be true when all its quantifiers are understood as ranging over
all possible sets, including ones not yet formed. But for ϕ to be true when
understood in this way is simply for its potentialist translation ϕ3 to be true.
(Linnebo, 2013, 222)
But if we are allowed to take such an “external” perspective on the whole potential hi-
erarchy, and even understand our quantifiers as ranging over all possible sets, then the
why-question simply resurfaces. Remember that philosophers who reject the minimal
explanation are quick to ask the why-question concerning the cumulative hierarchy:
“Why can’t we ‘collect together’ or ‘lasso’ all the sets in the cumulative hierarchy
and form a set of all sets?” Presumably, they imagine drawing a circle around Figure
1 and want to know why that doesn’t represent a set. But why couldn’t we ask the
same question with respect to the whole potential hierarchy of sets seen from this
“external” perspective? Imagine drawing a circle around Figure 2. Can’t we now ask:
“Why doesn’t that represent a (possibly existing) set?”
To answer the why-question for the cumulative hierarchy, the supporter of the
minimal explanation can reply that, strictly speaking, set theory happens “inside” the
universe V , that although we can “look” at V from the outside this doesn’t mean that
it is a set, and that in fact V is not a set on pain of inconsistency with set theory. The
potentialist isn’t satisfied with this answer. But what, besides the claim that modal set
theory precludes the existence of a world at which all sets exist, can the potentialist
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offer as an answer to the why-question for the potential hierarchy? She will similarly
point out that sets strictly exist “inside” worlds, that although we can (and do) look
at the whole hierarchy from the “outside” this doesn’t mean that we can form its set,
and that modal set theory is designed so that assuming that a universal set is possible
entails a contradiction.31 So the potentialist will have to provide us with a version
of the minimal explanation from within modal set theory, instead of providing the
minimal explanation from within ZFC.
This isn’t yet a devastating problem for the potentialist. Indeed, potentialists may
reply that modal set theory captures some deeper truths about sets than does ZFC,
and hence claim that the minimal explanation within modal set theory is more satis-
factory than the minimal explanation within ZFC. But this is where the potentialist’s
primitive and idiosyncratic notion of modality causes trouble. The second step of
the argument is thus to note, as we did above in §4.1, that the potential and itera-
tive hierarchies are isomorphic, and modal and non-modal set theories are mutually
interpretable.32 This means we cannot get any grip on the potentialist’s modality by
merely considering the set of true sentences containing ‘2’ and ‘3’. If, moreover, we
are given no independent grip on potentialist’s notion of modality (because we are
told it is primitive and idiosyncratic to set theory), then what stops us from simply
interpreting the domains of the worlds wα as stages Vα defined in ZFC? What exactly
is added by the ‘2’ and ‘3’ in front of quantifiers? Potentialism on this option starts
to look like a notational variant of set theory. And this surely affects its explanatory
power: To say that the universe of sets is not a set because it is “potential” in that
at any stage, we “can” form more sets in this unspecified and idiosyncratic sense of
“can” is not far from giving a dormitive virtue explanation, or saying nothing at all. In
other words, simply having unexplained ‘2’ and ‘3’ in front of the quantifiers in the
minimal explanation doesn’t make the potentialist explanation any deeper or more
informative than the minimal explanation. The potentialist explanation with this un-
explained, primitive and idiosyncratic notion of modality doesn’t provide any deeper
insight on the why-question than the minimal explanation.
We have just seen that in order to answer the why-question, potentialists com-
mend a costly detour through modal set theory. On the way of incurring the cost
just considered, their explanations ultimately rely on a minimal explanation and add
nothing to it. I will argue the same for the second way of incurring the cost in §4.3.
4.3 Interpreted Modality
The second option is to interpret the potentialist’s modality as somehow tracking the
practice of set theorists to accept the existence of larger and larger cardinals. As we
saw in §4.2, Linnebo considers this option in an attempt to re-interpret the practice of
set theorists:
31 See Linnebo (2013, 222f.) for one example of this kind of “design.”
32 One further result deserves mention here besides the one in §4.1. If ϕ is a formula all of whose
quantifiers are modalized, then modal set theory proves that ϕ , 2ϕ and 3ϕ are equivalent (see e.g. Studd
(2013, 709) and Linnebo (2013, 213)), meaning that it doesn’t matter at which world a full modalized
formula is evaluated, and which is “another reason why the implicit modalities that I have postulated in
the set-theoretic quantifiers do not surface in ordinary set-theoretic practice” (Linnebo, 2010, 164).
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As science progresses, we formulate set theories that characterize larger and
larger initial segments of the universe of sets. At any one time, precisely those
sets are actual whose existence follows from our strongest well-established
theory. (Linnebo, 2010, 159, fn. 21)33
The version of potentialism associated with this interpretation of the modality is sub-
tly different from the one we considered previously. My criticisms in this subsection
will only concern the main idea behind this version of potentialism, so I will keep
my exposition at a high level of generality; more detailed accounts can be found in
Koellner (ms), Parsons (1974), Rayo and Linnebo (2012) and Tait (2005).
In outline, potentialists of this variety claim that sets exist if and only if they are
specified by a theory (call this claim ‘Specifiability’). The motivation for Specifiabil-
ity may be a more constructivist or postulationist metaphysical outlook. Some poten-
tialists put constraints on the kinds of theories that can specify sets in Specifiability.
Tait, for instance, mentions the requirement of categoricity:
[W]e may speak about the existence of this or that object in mathematics only
when we have specified a consistent and categorical theory in which we speak
of such objects. (Tait, 2005, 141)
Others simply let the theories in question be the ones accepted by set theorists.
The second main claim these potentialists endorse is that theories can always be
expanded (call this ‘Expandability’). Then, Specifiability and Expandability together
provide the potentialist with an answer to the why-question: Since sets exist only if
they are specified by theories, and since theories can always be expanded, there is
no one completed totality of “all sets” which can form a set. In other words, just as
it makes no sense to “collect together” all theories, it similarly makes no sense to
“collect” together the universe of sets. Here is a quote I take to be voicing this idea:
[The potentialist] view makes it impossible to draw a clean separation be-
tween the question of how one might extend one’s expressive resources and
the question of how many sets exist. By increasing one’s expressive resources
in the right sort of way, one is led to recognize additional ontology. So inso-
far as one believes that the process of extending one’s expressive resources is
essentially open-ended, one should also think that the hierarchy of sets is es-
sentially open-ended—and therefore that there is no definite fact of the matter
about what sets there are. (Rayo and Linnebo, 2012, 292)
Once again, there are various ways to understand Expandability. Some philoso-
phers, like Linnebo in the quote above, take theories to be “expandable” in that set
theorists define and accept larger and larger cardinals (e.g. Inaccessible, Mahlo, Mea-
surable, Strong, Woodin, Supercompact, etc.)34 One problem with this understand-
ing is that it risks making the expandability of theories—and thereby also the non-
existence of a set of all sets—contingent on the particular choices and activities of set
theorists. Would there be a universal set if set theorists stopped accepting the exis-
33 See also Linnebo (2013, 207f.).
34 See Koellner (2011) for more on the Large Cardinal Hierarchy.
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tence of new cardinals? Surely not, since a universal set would still be inconsistent.35
A more plausible alternative is to say that theories are “expandable” in that for any
recursively enumerable theory Tn we can define Tn+1 = Tn+ “there is an inaccessi-
ble κ such that Vκ |= Tn,” or that any theory of the form ZFC+∃ϕ-cardinals can be
“expanded” to ZFC + “There is an inaccessible cardinal κ such that Vκ satisfies that
there is a ϕ-cardinal.”36
Now that we have a clearer picture of the potentialist explanation under this sec-
ond option for interpreting the potentialist’s modality, I want to raise a problem for
it that applies on either way of making precise Specifiability and Expandability. The
problem is that Expandability and Specifiability are compatible with the existence of
a universal set, hence they cannot explain why there is no set of all sets. Indeed, there
are set theories with universal sets (i.e. where it is an axiom that there is a set of all
sets) for which the same expandability phenomenon applies: One can define larger
and larger cardinals within such theories.37 To take a specific example, NFU+ (that is,
Jensen’s version of Quine’s NF modified to accommodate urelements, called ‘NFU’,
supplemented by Infinity and Choice) can be expanded as far as one is willing to
expand ZFC (Holmes, 2001).38 Nothing about those theories conflicts with Specifia-
bility. Thus, since Expandability and Specifiability are compatible with the existence
of a universal set, they cannot explain the absence of a universal set.
Let me consider a response on behalf of the potentialist. The potentialist may
state: “We are not concerned with set theories like NFU+. We are only interested
in set theories that formalize the iterative conception of sets, and hence that have
Foundation. NFU+ doesn’t have Foundation. Our claim is that within well-founded
theories, it is their expandability that explains why there is no set of all sets.”39 The
potentialist can state the same response with Separation instead of Foundation, for in-
stance. Without loss of generality, I will only focus on the response with Foundation.
I now want to argue that this response is unsuccessful, as it renders the potentialist
explanation either once again redundant or needlessly costly.
As we know, if we restrict our attention to theories that formalize the itera-
tive conception—and, in particular, to theories that have Foundation—then we have
Minimal ExplanationF, P; we can explain why the universe of sets is not a set with
a one-line mathematical argument. Instead, the potentialist wants to add a detour
35 There are many other problems facing a radical constructivist view on which the existence of sets
depends on whether set theorists define them or think about them. For one, it is widely accepted that
such a radical constructivist approach will only sanction a much weaker and non-classical set theory. But
actualists and potentialists don’t want to be revisionists—as we have seen, they want to “recover” most of
the axioms of ZF. So I set aside this kind of revisionist option in this paper. For a recent discussion and
summary of the arguments against constructivism, see for instance Incurvati (2012).
36 This way of making sense of expandability fits with Tait (2005) and Parsons (1974).
37 For exposition of set-theories with universal sets, see Forster (1992), Holmes (1998) and Holmes
(2001).
38 NFU is consistent (relative to PA) and NFU+ is consistent relative to Zermelo set theory with only
∆0-Comprehension (Jensen, 1969). NFU+ + the Axiom of Cantorian Sets (which says that all Cantorian
sets are strongly Cantorian) proves the existence of inaccessible cardinals, and n-Mahlo cardinals for each
n. A Cantorian set is a set A such that |A| = |P1(A)|, whereP1(A) is the set of all one-element subsets
of A, and a set A is strongly Cantorian if the class map (x 7→ {x})  A is a set.
39 Potentialists usually make clear that their focus is on the iterative concept of set, so this kind of
response is not implausible for a potentialist. See for instance Linnebo (2010, 144).
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through Expandability. But this is an unnecessary detour, given that Expandability
by itself is compatible with the existence of a universal set; Expandability is an idle
wheel in the explanation of why there is no set of all sets. The core problem with the
universal set isn’t that set theories such as ZFC can be expanded: The core problem
is that a universal set would be inconsistent with the assumptions of a theory that
formalizes the iterative conception of sets, such as ZFC.
One might object to this argument by denying something like the following prin-
ciple, which seems to be implicit in it: If a fact p is compatible with q not obtaining,
then p cannot explain q.40 However, a related worry faces the potentialist explanation
whatever stance one takes towards this principle. At this stage of the dialectic, poten-
tialists face two alternative explanations: The first one (i) appeals to Expandability,
Specifiability, Foundation and Pairing, the second one (ii) (Minimal ExplanationF, P)
appeals to Foundation and Pairing. If the potentialist insists on providing explanation
(i), then she incurs costs both because (i) is much more complicated than (ii), but also
because (i) contains an extra assumption, Specifiability, that needs to be defended.
Indeed, why think that sets are specifiable totalities in the first place? This assump-
tion isn’t even part of the iterative conception of sets. The potentialist here buys the
explanatory distance at the cost of having to defend a substantial metaphysical as-
sumption about the nature of sets.
5 The Conception-Based Explanation
In §§3–4, I argued that both the size-explanation and the potentialist explanation rely
on the minimal explanation and add nothing to it. I take the problems with these alter-
native answers to give us reason to reconsider the minimal explanation as an answer
to the why-question. But I am also convinced that the core complaint against the min-
imal explanation stated in §2 is correct. The why-question asks why the universe of
sets is not a set, while the minimal explanation only explains why the universe of
sets is not a set according to ZFC; we should thus demand at least some independent
reason why the axioms that prohibit the existence of the universal set are there in the
first place.
In what follows, I propose a close alternative to the minimal explanation, which
I call ‘the conception-based explanation’. I argue that the conception-based explana-
tion avoids the core complaint against the minimal explanation at least as well as the
size-actualist and potentialist explanations. The conception-based explanation is also
more parsimonious than the size-actualist and potentialist explanations, and it doesn’t
face the problems discussed above in §§3–4. I conclude that the conception-based ex-
planation is the best available answer to the why-question.
In §4.1, I explained the iterative conception of sets. More generally, and in line
with common usage, I understand a “conception” of sets to be a way of thinking about
sets that is generally accepted or presupposed within some particular mathematical
community. The iterative conception of sets, arguably originating in Zermelo (1930),
is a way of thinking about sets as forming the iterative hierarchy of sets described in
40 In the literature on grounding, people call this principle ‘the entailment principle’ (Rosen, 2010). Eli
Chudnoff (ms) and Jonathan Dancy (2004) are among philosophers who deny this principle.
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§4.1. This way of thinking about sets is at the origin of the why-question; philoso-
phers who ask the why-question assume the iterative conception of sets, as can be
seen in the quote from Simmons in §2 or in the following quote from Linnebo:
By ‘set’ I mean set as on the iterative conception, according to which sets are
“formed” in stages. (Linnebo, 2010, 144)41
Now consider the following response to the why-question:
Conception-Based Explanation The universe of sets is not a set because the suppo-
sition that it is contradicts some axioms of ZFC, and these axioms are part of the
iterative conception of sets.
Just as the minimal explanation has various instances, so does the conception-based
explanation. Here is one such instance, in analogy with Minimal ExplanationF, P:
Conception-Based ExplanationF, P The universe of sets is not a set because the sup-
position that it is contradicts Foundation and Pairing, and Foundation and Pairing
are part of the iterative conception of sets.
What the conception-based explanation adds to the minimal explanation is the claim
that the axioms that prohibit the existence of a universal set are part of the itera-
tive conception of sets. In particular, what Conception-Based ExplanationF, P adds
to Minimal ExplanationF, P is the claim that Foundation and Pairing are part of the
iterative conception of sets. The conception-based explanation is thus a “deep” ex-
planation in the sense of §2. It provides an independent reason for why the axioms
that prohibit the existence of the universal set are there in the first place: They are
simply part of our iterative conception of sets, they are part of what we (who ask the
why-question) usually believe or presuppose about sets. If the axioms that prohibit
the existence of the universal set are indeed part of the iterative conception of sets,
then the conception-based explanation is one we—we who ask the why-question and
work with the iterative conception of sets—should be happy with.
What remains to be shown is that at least some axioms that prohibit the existence
of a universal set are indeed part of the iterative conception of sets. In other words,
one needs to defend either that Foundation and Pairing are part of the iterative con-
ception of sets, or that Separation is part of the iterative conception of sets, etc. But
recall that many philosophers—and perhaps most famously Boolos (1971)—have al-
ready argued that Foundation and Pairing (and Separation) are part of the iterative
conception of sets. Here, for instance, is a summary of the argument for why Pair-
ing is part of the iterative conception of sets. According to the iterative conception
of sets, every set appears at some stage. Assume that a and b appear at some stage.
Without loss of generality, assume that b appears after a. Then the pair set {a,b}
appears immediately after the stage where b appears, since, according to the iterative
conception, that next stage is the stage where all the sets of sets formed so far appears.
Pairing follows.42
A similar argument can be given for the claim that Foundation is part of the itera-
tive conception of sets.43 I will not rehearse it here, but instead note that philosophers
41 See also Studd (2013, 698).
42 This argument can be found for instance in Maddy (1988, 485).
43 Aside from Boolos (1971), see also for instance Shoenfield (1977, 327).
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have often maintained that Foundation is not only part of but essential to the iterative
conception of sets. See for instance Parsons and Boolos:
One can state in approximately neutral fashion what is essential to the ‘iter-
ative’ conception: Sets form a well-founded hierarchy in which the elements
of a set precede the set itself. In axiomatic set theory, this idea is most directly
expressed by the axiom of foundation, which says that any non-empty set has
an ‘∈-minimal’ element. (Parsons, 1977, 335f.)
Whatever tenuous hold on the concepts of set and member were given one by
Cantor’s definition of “set” and one’s ordinary understanding of “element,”
“set,” “collection,” etc. is altogether lost if one is to suppose that some sets
are members of themselves. (Boolos, 1971, 219)
Thus Foundation and Pairing are part of the iterative conception of sets, as is assumed
by Conception-Based ExplanationF, P. Similar arguments can be given for other in-
stances of the conception-based explanation, but it is enough for my purposes here to
argue for the assumptions of just one instance of the conception-based explanation.
Let us now examine how the conception-based explanation fares in comparison
with the potentialist or size-actualist explanations specifically with respect to the core
complaint against the minimal explanation stated in §2.
Take the potentialist explanation first. I claim that the potentialist explanation
for the why-question is deep in the same way as the conception-based explanation
is deep. As we saw in §4.1, potentialists motivate the axioms for modal set theory
from the iterative conception of sets, and then provide a minimal explanation from
within modal set theory. So their explanation is fundamentally of the same kind as the
conception-based explanation: The principles that prohibit the existence of a univer-
sal set in the potentialist explanation are put forward as being motivated or justified by
the iterative conception of sets. The problem with the potentialist explanation is that it
commends a spurious and costly detour through principles that are either unexplained
(such as the principles of modal set theory with the idiosyncratic and primitive notion
of modality, seen in §4.2) or undefended (such as Specifiability, seen in §4.3). These
principles are much less obviously part of the iterative conception of sets than Foun-
dation, Pairing, or Separation—unless of course the principles of modal set theory
are mere notational variants of ZF, but in which case nothing is added by the poten-
tialist explanation.44 So the conception-based explanation fares at least as well as the
potentialist explanation with respect to the core complaint: If one accepts that the po-
tentialist explanation avoids the core complaint, then one should also accept that the
conception-based explanation avoids the core complaint. But the conception-based
explanation (i) is more parsimonious than the potentialist explanation, (ii) makes no
controversial assumptions concerning what is part of the iterative conception of sets,
and (iii) doesn’t face the problems explained in §§4.2–4.3.
Now take the size-explanation. The size-explanation for the why-question appeals
to the Limitation of Size Principle, which quite plausibly isn’t part of the iterative
44 Potentialists themselves might agree with this point. Indeed, Linnebo himself simply assumes Foun-
dation in his modal set theory (Linnebo, 2013).
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conception of sets. But the Limitation of Size Principle also stems from a partic-
ular conception of sets, arguably originating in Cantor’s work, according to which
sets are “small” collections.45 Once again, the conception-based explanation thus
fares at least as well as the size-explanation with respect to the core complaint: The
conception-based explanation and the size-explanation both avoid the core complaint
by appealing to what is part of our conception of sets. But the conception-based ex-
planation doesn’t face the serious Objection from the Explanatory Insignificance of
Size raised in §3.2.
So the conception-based explanation fares at least as well with respect to the
core complaint as the size-explanation and the potentialist explanation: The size-
explanation, the potentialist explanation, and the conception-based explanation all
avoid the core complaint against the minimal explanation by appealing to what is
part of our conception of sets. But the conception-based explanation is more par-
simonious and less problematic than either the size-explanation and the potentialist
explanation. The conception-based explanation should thus be preferred to both the
size-explanation and the potentialist explanation; it is the best available answer to the
why-question.
We saw that everyone in the debate over the why-question presupposes the itera-
tive conception. We also saw that size-actualists and potentialists alike appeal to what
is part of our conception of sets in explaining why the universe of sets is not a set.
Hence the conception-based explanation provides a satisfactory response to the why-
question by the lights of everyone involved in the debate. This concludes my case for
the superiority of the conception-based explanation over its rivals.
At some point, we may want to ask where the iterative conception itself comes
from, and how it, in turn, is justified. The answer to these questions could then also
provide us with a better understanding of the nature of the conception-based expla-
nation. I will conclude the paper by providing a roadmap for answering these further
questions.
In my view, the iterative conception of sets is part of the (or at least a) con-
cept of set; it is part of what we—we who ask the why-question and work with the
iterative conception—mean by ‘set’.46 On this view, not only are Foundation, Pair-
ing, and Separation part of the iterative conception of sets, they are also part of the
concept of set; they are part of what we—we who ask the why-question and work
with the iterative conception—mean by ‘set’. This view is often at least implicitly
shared among participants in the present dispute. For instance, at least on the face of
it, Linnebo in the previous quote states that the iterative conception is part of what
we mean by ‘set’. Also in his last quote above, Boolos seems to be stating that if
we know anything about the concepts expressed by ‘set’ and ‘member’—at least the
concepts expressed by ‘set’ and ‘member’ on Cantor’s usage of these expressions—
then we know that sets cannot be members of themselves, which is an elementary
consequence of Foundation. See for instance also Burgess concerning Separation:
45 For more on the conception of sets based on the Limitation of Size Principle, see for instance Maddy
(1988, 484f.) or Hallett (1984).
46 For simplicity, I assume here that the concept of set is the meaning of our expression ‘set’.
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However formulated, the assumption of separation is so fundamental to Can-
torian thought that it is arguably inappropriate to apply Cantor’s word ‘set’
[Menge] to theories (such as Quine’s NF and ML) that do not accept it. In
other words, separation may be regarded as a partial explication of the con-
cept of set, indicating what sets are supposed to be like if they exist. (Burgess,
2004, 203)
It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue that the iterative conception—or
more specifically that Foundation, Pairing, and Separation—are conceptual truths,
especially given that the existence of conceptual truths is a highly disputed philo-
sophical claim.47 As I explained above, we also don’t need to argue for this in order
to show that the conception-based explanation is the best available answer to the
why-question. What I do want to point out here, however, is that if the iterative con-
ception of sets is indeed conceptually true, then the conception-based explanation
should be understood as a kind of conceptual explanation. And this would show that
the conception-based explanation is the best possible explanation for why there is no
set of all sets.
Let me explain this with a somewhat simplistic analogy. Consider the question:
“Why can’t one be a happily married bachelor?” The equivalent “minimal” explana-
tion here would be: “One can’t be a happily married bachelor, because one would then
be both married and a bachelor, and bachelors are unmarried. Contradiction.” Now
consider the following conceptual explanation that goes slightly beyond this minimal
explanation, in that it makes explicit that the facts to which this minimal explanation
appeals are conceptual truths: “One can’t be a happily married bachelor because one
would then be both married and a bachelor, and bachelors are by definition unmarried
(or, it is a conceptual truth that bachelors are unmarried). Contradiction.” The con-
ceptual explanation here is clearly more satisfactory than the minimal explanation;
it gives some independent reason for why the assumptions that prohibit bachelors
from being happily married are there in the first place. It is also clearly a satisfactory
answer to the given question: Nothing more is needed to explain why one cannot be
a happily married bachelor once one knows the definition of ‘bachelor’. Now if the
iterative conception—or Foundation, Pairing, and Separation—are conceptually true,
then the conception-based explanation should be understood to be of the same kind as
this conceptual explanation: The fact that there is no universe of all sets is an elemen-
tary consequence of conceptual truths about sets, and that is as good an explanation
of why the universe of sets is not a set as we can get.
So if the conception-based explanation is indeed a conceptual explanation, we can
see why the conception-based explanation is the best answer to the why-question. Of
course, much more needs to be said to defend the view that the iterative conception
of sets is conceptually true. The bachelor example above only serves to illustrate
the point that a conceptual explanation would be all one could ask for; I don’t want
to suggest that the mathematical case is quite as simple. In order to defend that the
iterative conception of sets is conceptually true, one would need to examine, just for
47 There is a long line of arguments against the existence of conceptual or analytic truths and/or of their
epistemological consequences, including Quine (1951), Putnam (1962) and the most recent Williamson
(2007).
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one example, how exactly this view fares with the existence of alternative set theories.
I leave the question of how exactly the conceptual explanation would look for future
research.
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